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INTRODUCTION
The Armed Career Criminal Act (hereinafter “ACCA”) provides for
higher penalties if an offender has three previous convictions for a “violent
felony.”1 In the immigration context, any alien, including a lawful permanent

* J.D., May 2016, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law; Former Executive Editor, Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology. I would like to thank my editors, Jeffrey Wysong, Matthew
Gordon and Dmitri Rizek, for their extraordinary editorial advice. Special thanks to Benjamin
Mark Moss, J.D., American University Washington College of Law, 2010, for inspiration,
editing, guidance, friendship and thoughtful feedback, all without which this comment would
not have been published, as well as Judge Marjorie K. Allard, Alaska Court of Appeals, for
her much-appreciated assistance. Finally, I would like to thank my wife for her unconditional
love and support over the years.
1
18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
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resident, is deportable if he or she is convicted of an “aggravated felony.”2
Both of these felony categories include state criminal convictions for the
crimes that fall into these categories, like robbery, burglary, or arson.3 Not all
state criminal statutes are the same, however, and the elements of a given
crime can vary across jurisdictions.4
This patchwork of definitions leads to some obvious difficulties for
federal courts when it comes to determining whether an offender’s previous
convictions fit into these “violent” or “aggravated” categories and are thus
predicates for enhanced criminal penalties or removal.5 To help provide
guidance in this area, the Supreme Court developed the “categorical
approach,” which requires any state criminal statute to be identical to or
narrower in scope than the generic version.6 There are times, however, where
the elements of a state crime are written in a way that could criminalize two
different courses of conduct, one that is a generic crime and one that is not.
In these situations, the Supreme Court created the “modified categorical
approach.”7 This approach allows a sentencing court, or an immigration
judge, to look beyond the bare elements of the crime to a limited set of
documents to determine whether the defendant or alien was convicted of the
generic offense.8
While these approaches (and when to use them) are simple enough to
understand in the abstract, they are difficult to apply in practice, often leading
to inconsistent results among the lower federal courts.9 Two recent Supreme
Court cases, Descamps v. United States10 and Mathis v. United States,11 have
attempted to resolve these issues in order to clarify when it is appropriate to
use the modified approach while also giving clearer guidance to the lower
courts. Yet, some questions and ambiguities still remain.
Part I of this comment will explain the difference between indivisible
and divisible statutes, which is the basis for this particular issue of statutory
interpretation. This part will also explain the categorical and modified
2

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009).
4
See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).
5
See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2290 (2013); Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41.
6
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598.
7
See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
8
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
9
See, e.g., United States v. Aguila-Montes De Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (per curiam), abrogated by Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2286–92; United States v. VenzorGranillo, 668 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Fife, 624 F.3d 441, 446 (7th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Martinez-Hernandez, 422 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 2005).
10
133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
11
136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
3
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categorical approaches to statutory interpretation to illustrate why the
Supreme Court created these categories and how they have evolved over
time. Part II will examine the Court’s recent attempts to clarify and give
guidance on these issues in Descamps and Mathis. Part III will discuss the
issues that still remain after Mathis and what the Court could possibly do (and
perhaps should do) next.
I. BACKGROUND
State criminal statutes can qualify as predicate offenses under federal
law if the state criminal statute qualifies as a generic offense.12 State criminal
statutes that correspond to a majority of state criminal codes roughly
correspond with generic offenses.13 For example, the ACCA enhances
sentences for defendants with three prior violent felony convictions.14 The
statute defines a “violent felony” as a crime that is both punishable by a year
of imprisonment and “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.”15 To qualify for violent felony status, a
state criminal statute must contain the roughly similar elements as the generic
offense.16
Complicating matters is that some statutes criminalize different types of
conduct within the same section, so it is often unclear if the defendant was
convicted of a generic offense. To determine whether a specific state criminal
statute, written in the disjunctive, is a generic offense, the Supreme Court has
created a two-step analysis: first, the sentencing court must determine if the
offense is made up of a single set of “indivisible” elements, or if it has
“divisible,” alternative elements. If the statute is indivisible, the court can
only use the “categorical” approach, where the court evaluates only the
elements of the conviction statute to see if it is a generic offense. If the statute
is divisible, the court uses the “modified categorical” approach, where it can
look to a limited set of documents from the earlier conviction to determine
whether the statute is a generic offense.
A. INDIVISIBLE V. DIVISIBLE STATUTES

As noted above, indivisible statutes are statutes that require a single set
of elements to be met in order to convict a defendant of a crime, and divisible
12
13
14
15
16

See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009).
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).
18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
Id.
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598.
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statutes provide that a defendant can be convicted of a crime without one or
more elements being met. The majority of criminal statutes the federal courts
must evaluate are written as indivisible, while divisible statutes are rare.17
The distinction between the two statutes is best shown by example.
Imagine a statute defining murder as “unlawful killing with intent to kill.”18
This statute has three elements: (1) someone is killed by another’s actions;
(2) the killing is unlawful (i.e., without justification or excuse); and (3) the
actor intended to kill. An individual is then charged with shooting a gun at
two people standing next to each other, killing one of them.
Here, the first two elements of the hypothetical statute are met: someone
was killed by another’s unlawful actions. As for the last element, two
members of the jury could reasonably disagree who the defendant was aiming
for. One juror thinks the defendant meant to shoot the victim while the other
juror thinks the defendant meant to shoot the survivor and missed. In the end,
this disagreement does not matter because both jurors agree that the shooter
had the requisite intent as required by the element of the statute.19 The statute
is indivisible because all elements need to be met for an individual to be
guilty.
For most state criminal statutes, when judges interpret them to see if
they match a generic statute, the means used by a defendant to meet an
element are irrelevant.20 If the above hypothetical murder statute added
17

See United States v. Archer, No. 2:14-CR-00334, 2015 WL 3562549, at *2 (D. Utah
June 4, 2015) (noting that the application of the modified approach in cases is rare).
18
See, e.g., D.C. Code § 22-2101; Cal. Pen. Code §§ 187–88 (defining murder as killing
with malice aforethought and defining malice as a “deliberate intention [] to take away the life
of a fellow creature”); Miss. Code § 97-3-19(1)(a); 720 ILCS 5/9-1; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a);
Michigan v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 714 (1980).
19
This is essentially the classic common law doctrine of transferred intent, where “a
defendant who . . . [intends] to kill a certain person and [kills] a bystander instead is subject to
the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had the fatal blow reached the person
for whom intended.” California v. Bland, 28 Cal. 4th 313, 321 (Cal. 2002); see also Lieutenant
Colonel LeEllen Coacher & Captain Libby Gallo, Criminal Liability: Transferred Intent and
Concurrent Intent, 44 A.F. L. REV. 227, 229 (1998) (“The doctrine of transferred intent exists
when a defendant, who intends to kill one person but instead kills a bystander, is deemed the
author for whatever kind of homicide would have been committed had he killed the intended
victim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Daniel J. Curry, Poe v. State: The Court of
Appeals of Maryland Limits the Applicability of the Doctrine of Transferred Intent, 27 U.
BALT. L. REV. 167, 167 (1997) (“The doctrine has been viable since the early English common
law.”); William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. L. REV. 650, 652 (1967) (“The doctrine
of “transferred intent” appeared first in criminal cases at a time when tort and crime were still
merged in the trespass action.”).
20
See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2290 (2013) (“As long as the statute
itself requires only an indeterminate ‘weapon,’ that is all the indictment must (or is likely to)
allege and all the jury instructions must (or are likely to) mention. And most important, that is
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another element to define murder as “unlawful killing with intent to kill by
use of a weapon,” it would not matter if the defendant used a knife, a gun, or
a bike chain; as long as a weapon is used, the element would be met.21 In the
end, a prosecutor must prove a single group of elements for a jury to convict
a defendant of the crime.22
The distinctive (but not dispositive) characteristic of divisible statutes is
that they have an element written in the alternative. The crime itself has the
same name attached to it, but the defendant need not satisfy every element
listed to have committed the crime. The murder statute described above
would become divisible if revised to say murder is “unlawful killing with
intent to kill by use of a weapon in a car or in a home.” Now the statutory
elements are as follows: (1) someone was killed; (2) the killing was not
permitted by law; (3) the killing was accomplished with a weapon; (4) the
actor intended to kill; and (5) the killing was either in a (a) car or (b) home.
This is what the Court meant when it referred to a divisible statute as “a
[single] statutory provision that covers several different generic crimes.” 23
The defendant can be guilty of murder whether he snuck into the victim’s
house and shot him or strangled him from the backseat of the victim’s car
with a piano wire.24 A prosecutor need not prove that the defendant killed in
both the car and the home to satisfy the last element. The alternative means
at issue here would be the gun or the piano wire to commit the murder since
either can be used as a weapon. The alternative element is the location of the
murder.25
The distinction between indivisible and divisible statutes has a major
effect on the way a court determines whether a state criminal statute is the
same as a generic offense, and thus, whether the defendant’s prior conviction
carries ACCA or immigration consequences. Interpreting state criminal
statutes to see if they are consistent with federal criminal statutes that would
all the jury must find to convict the defendant. The jurors need not all agree on whether the
defendant used a gun or a knife or a tire iron (or any other particular weapon that might appear
in an imagined divisible statute), because the actual statute requires the jury to find only a
‘weapon.’”).
21
Id.; see 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons and Firearms § 1 (“A ‘weapon’ is broadly defined as
anything used or designed to be used in destroying, defeating, or injuring an enemy; it is an
instrument of offensive or defensive combat.”).
22
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290.
23
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009).
24
THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972).
25
A statute written in the disjunctive, however, does not always mean the statute is
divisible. As discussed further below, whether a statute is divisible or indivisible depends on
whether the statute lists alternative means of conduct to satisfy the element or actual alternative
elements. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285.

4. MCGIVNEY (JWM FINAL)

426

7/5/2017 3:35 PM

MCGIVNEY

[Vol. 107

be predicates for sentence enhancement or removal is not as easy as looking
at the labels affixed to each statute.26 Thus, the Supreme Court, out of
necessity, developed two different approaches to help resolve this issue.
B. CATEGORICAL APPROACH

In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court established the “formal
categorical approach,” through which courts interpret convictions under state
criminal statutes as potential predicates for federal sentence enhancement.”27
The Court held that sentencing courts may only look at elements of the prior
offense and not the facts of the underlying conviction.28 If a state criminal
statute is the same as (or narrower than) the generic crime, then it is a “violent
felony” as defined by the ACCA.29 Even if the conviction statute prohibits
conduct that is narrower than a generic crime, it can be a violent felony.30
However, if the state criminal statute criminalizes conduct that is broader
than the generic crime, it cannot count as a violent felony as defined by the
ACCA, even if the facts would show that the crime was committed according
to the generic requirements.31 Therefore, when sentencing, courts are only
allowed to look to the elements of the statute and not the facts of the
underlying case.32
C. MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH33

Taylor recognized that there were going to be cases where looking at
“the charging paper and jury instructions” would be necessary.34 Although
the Court stressed that this “range of cases” would be particularly “narrow,”
this unnamed approach would make it permissible to look at some of the
underlying documents when the statute has alternative elements, or, in other
words, is divisible.35 One element would be part of the generic offense and
26
The state criminal statute at issue in the Ninth Circuit case Rendon v. Holder is a prime
example, as the California “burglary” statute criminalizes conduct that is greater than the
generic offense of burglary. 764 F.3d 1077, 1090 (2014).
27
495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 599.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990).
33
Although courts are still dissatisfied with the uninspired label for this approach, they
have yet to come up with a better name. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281
(2013) (“We have previously approved a variant of this method—labeled (not very
inventively) the ‘modified categorical approach.’”).
34
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
35
Id.
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the alternative element would not.36
The Taylor Court imagined a burglary statute that prohibits breaking
into a car or a building.37 The building is part of the generic offense of
burglary because it is an element in a majority of state criminal codes. Cars,
however, are not included in a majority of burglary codes. To convict a
defendant for burglary, a prosecutor would need to charge and prove one
element to the jury, while ignoring the other.38 It is impossible to charge a
defendant with simultaneously breaking into a building and a car since a
person cannot physically be in two different places at the same time.39
According to the Taylor Court, one scenario—the building—involves
all the elements of the generic crime of burglary.40 The other scenario—the
car—would not be an element of the generic crime of burglary because it
criminalizes behavior broader than the generic crime of burglary.41 While the
building scenario is applicable to the ACCA for sentencing purposes, it is not
clear, from just looking at the statute, that the defendant was convicted of the
generic crime.42 In Taylor’s example, it would be necessary for the
sentencing court to look at a limited set of underlying documents, specifically
the indictment or jury instructions, to see if the defendant was convicted of
breaking into a house or into a car.43
Shepard v. United States was the first Supreme Court case to use this
modified categorical approach.44 Significantly, the Supreme Court first held
that guilty pleas are just as applicable as jury verdicts for purposes of
examining state criminal statutes as predicates for the ACCA. 45 It reasoned
36

Id.
Id.
38
Id. (“[I]f the indictment or information and jury instructions show that the defendant
was charged only with a burglary of a building, and that the jury necessarily had to find an
entry of a building to convict, then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction
for enhancement.”).
39
Assuming the car is not inside the building.
40
See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
41
Id.; see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005) (“Because statutes in some
States (like Massachusetts) define burglary more broadly, as by extending it to entries into
boats and cars, we had to consider how a later court sentencing under the ACCA might tell
whether a prior burglary conviction was for the generic offense.”); see also Jennifer Lee Koh,
The Whole is Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the
Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 311 (2012).
42
See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
43
Id.
44
544 U.S. 13, 23 (2005).
45
Id. at 20 (“In cases tried without a jury, the closest analogs to jury instructions would be
a bench-trial judge’s formal rulings of law and findings of fact, and in pleaded cases they
would be the statement of factual basis for the charge . . . shown by a transcript of plea
37
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that, in this context at least, there is no difference between a defendant
admitting to all necessary elements of a charged offense and a jury finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that all the necessary elements have been met.46
The Shepard Court next held that, when faced with a divisible statute,
for a conviction to actually be a predicate for the ACCA, the defendant must
still admit to the elements of a generic offense.47 In this case, the burglary
statute had an alternative element that provided for breaking into a building,
car, or boat.48 The guilty plea did not indicate whether the defendant broke
into a building (satisfying the ACCA) or a boat or a car (which would not
satisfy the ACCA).49 The Court held that because of this ambiguity—and the
fact the defendant confessed—the district court could look at the plea
agreement or the plea colloquy, to see if the defendant pled guilty to the
generic element or the alternative element, bringing the total amount of
reviewable documents to four.50 The Court reiterated that the modified
approach does not permit looking at facts of the underlying conviction, but
at the elements the defendant was convicted of to see if they comported with
the general offense.51
The modified categorical approach, set forth in Taylor and Shepard, was
given its name in Nijhawan v. Holder.52 In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court
analyzed a Massachusetts statute that prohibited breaking and entering at
night in any of four alternative places: a “building, ship, vessel, or vehicle.”53
Only one of those places—the building—would qualify as a predicate for the
ACCA.54 The Court noted that when a single statute involves different crimes
and not all of them fit into an ACCA definition, courts must determine which
crime formed the basis of the conviction.55 To do that, courts must look at
colloquy or by written plea agreement presented to the court, or by a record of comparable
findings of fact adopted by the defendant upon entering the plea.”).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 17.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 20.
51
Id. at 26 (“We hold that enquiry under the ACCA to determine whether a plea of guilty
to burglary defined by a nongeneric statute necessarily admitted elements of the generic
offense is limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or
transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was
confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.”).
52
557 U.S. 29, 49 (2009).
53
Id. at 35 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 266, § 16 (West 2006)).
54
Id.
55
Id. (“[A] court must determine whether an offender’s prior conviction was for the
violent, rather than the nonviolent, breaking that this single five-word phrase describes (e.g.,
breaking into a building rather than into a vessel).”).
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one of the limited set of documents permitted in cases like Taylor and
Shepard.56 The Supreme Court reiterated this in Johnson v. United States,
holding that a court may not look to these documents to determine the
underlying facts of the conviction, but only the “statutory phrase” that is the
basis of conviction.57
II. WHEN A STATUTE IS DIVISIBLE AND WHEN IT IS NOT
Despite the directives and guidelines of Taylor, Shepard, Nijhawan, and
Johnson, lower courts were still confused as to when and how to apply the
modified approach.58 This came to a head in Descamps v. United States,59
where the Court considered whether “courts may also consult [the documents
approved in Taylor and Shepard] when a defendant was convicted under an
‘indivisible’ statute . . . that criminalizes a broader swath of conduct than the
relevant generic offense.”60 The Court held, emphatically, that it is not
permissible for interpreting indivisible statutes, as the approach would allow
courts to abuse their position by consistently looking past the fact of
conviction to the underlying facts of the prior conviction, even if the elements
are not a predicate under the categorical approach.61
Descamps also held that, for a statute to be divisible, the alternative
elements must provide for different crimes within the same set of elements,
while alternative means are only different ways of meeting one element in
that set.62 While the Court made this distinction, it left relatively little
guidance as to identifying what are alternative elements and what are
alternative means when reading a statute.63
56

Id.
559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010) (“[T]he ‘modified categorical approach’ . . . permits a court
to determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction by consulting the trial
record . . . .”).
58
See, e.g., United States v. Venzor-Granillo, 668 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012)
(holding an ambiguity existed where the language in a state criminal statute criminalized
broader conduct and that permitted the use of the modified approach).
59
133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013).
60
Id. at 2281.
61
Id. at 2281-82.
62
Id. at 2285 n.2; see also United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, 756 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 124, 190 (2014) (“[U]nder Descamps, what must be
divisible are the elements of the crime, not the mode or means of proving an element.”).
63
E.g., compare Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1084–90 (9th Cir. 2014)
(means/elements determined by whether jury must unanimously agree on phrasing, then
documents can be consulted), with Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 466–473 (9th Cir. 2015)
(denial of en banc review) (Graber, J., dissenting (joined by seven judges)) (courts must look
at underlying documents to see if it is a predicate offense first) and id. at 473–474 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (courts can take a “peek” at the documents to resolve means/elements dispute).
57
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Three years later, in Mathis v. United States,64 the Court again addressed
this issue and attempted to answer the question of “whether ACCA makes an
exception to [the] rule [of equal or narrower elements of the generic crime]
when a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative
means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements.”65 The Court held that it
does not,66 but also tried to answer the question of when a statute lists means
or elements.67 To the Court, the answer largely depended on each
jurisdiction’s own interpretation or phrasing, but, if that was still not clear, it
was permissible for federal sentencing courts to look to the Taylor/Shepard
documents in order to answer the question.68
A. CORRECTING LOWER COURT APPLICATIONS OF THE MODIFIED
APPROACH: DESCAMPS

Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Descamps is one of the best
illustrations of the differences between the formal categorical approach and
the modified categorical approach.69 Matthew Robert Descamps was
convicted of illegal possession of a firearm and had an extensive criminal
history, which included three previous felony convictions.70 One of these
previous convictions was under California Penal Code § 459, which, as the
Court described it, applies to: “A ‘person who enters’ certain locations ‘with
intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.’”71
Descamps’s sentence under the possession statute would have only been ten
years, but, if applicable, the ACCA would have increased his sentence to a
minimum of fifteen years.72
The district court used the modified categorical approach and examined
documents from the prior conviction—specifically the plea colloquy—to
find that Descamps’s burglary involved breaking and entering.73 The court
concluded that Descamps’s § 459 conviction qualified as generic burglary
and was within the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA.74
64

136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
Id. at 2248–49.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 2256–57.
68
Id.
69
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283–86 (2013).
70
United States v. Descamps, No. CR–05–104–FVS, 2012 WL 3144051, at *1 (E.D.
Wash. Nov. 21, 2007).
71
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2282 (quoting Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 459 (West 2010)).
72
Id.
73
Id. at Appendix F, at 50a.
74
Id.
65
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed.75 Relying on its previous decision in United
States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca,76 the court held that if a state criminal statute
is categorically broader than the generic crime, a court is permitted to use the
modified categorical approach to scrutinize certain conviction documents.77
Descamps appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the California statute
was broader than usual burglary statutes and therefore the conviction did not
meet the standards for a violent felony.78
The Supreme Court reversed.79 It clarified that the modified categorical
approach is only used in limited circumstances where it is unclear which
element in a divisible statute was met to bring about the conviction.80 Citing
Taylor, the Court ruled that the California statute did not meet the ACCA
violent felony standard because it was too broad.81 Further, it ruled that § 459
does not have divisible elements and covers simple shoplifting as well as
burglary.82 Since not all the elements of the generic crime of burglary needed
to be proven at trial, the California statute was not a predicate ACCA
offense.83
The Court based part of its reasoning on the text and history of the
ACCA.84 Because the statutory language specifically identifies convictions,
and not merely commissions, Congress intended for courts to only look at the
fact of conviction and not underlying facts giving rise to the convictions. 85
Other statutes may point to circumstances rather than convictions, but the
ACCA’s legislative history showed that Congress intended only the
conviction to count for enhancement, and not for the enhancement to depend
75

United States v. Descamps, 466 F. App’x 563, 565–66 (9th Cir. 2012).
655 F.3d 915, 944 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam), abrogated by Descamps, 133
S. Ct. at 2286–92.
77
Descamps, 466 F. App’x at 565 (“Burglary under § 459 is categorically broader than
generic burglary . . . . We therefore apply the modified categorical approach.”).
78
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2282.
79
Id. at 2293.
80
Id. at 2285. (“The modified approach thus has no role to play in this case. The dispute
here does not concern any list of alternative elements. Rather, it involves a simple discrepancy
between generic burglary and the crime established in § 459.”).
81
Id. at 2285–86.
82
Id. (“[Generic burglary] requires an unlawful entry along the lines of breaking and
entering . . . . [§ 459] does not, and indeed covers simple shoplifting, as even the Government
acknowledges . . . . [Therefore], § 459 define[s] burglary more broadly than the generic
offense . . . . [B]ecause California, to get a conviction, need not prove that Descamps broke
and entered—a § 459 violation cannot serve as an ACCA predicate.” (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)).
83
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285–86.
84
Id. at 2287.
85
Id.
76
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on the facts of the case.86
The Court also reasoned that applying the modified categorical
approach to indivisible statutes would allow a reviewing court to evaluate
evidence, which is not appropriate in most circumstances.87 This would give
the reviewing court the power to determine what facts the jury relied upon to
convict, or the judge accepted in a plea,88 violating the Sixth Amendment.89
Moreover, according to the Court, facts in these underlying documents
are often misleading and uncertain.90 A defendant may have no incentive to
challenge, and may be less likely to challenge, certain facts if they are not
part of a charged element.91 Trials often contain extraneous facts that have
little or no bearing on the elements of the crime.92 Defendants are also less
likely to quibble with a court or prosecutors over factual allegations during a
plea agreement.93
Lastly, the Court ruled that the Ninth Circuit’s holding had (or could
have) disastrous effects for defendants in plea agreements.94 When agreeing
to plea deals, defendants often plead guilty to lesser included offenses in
exchange for lighter sentences.95 The crime charged may qualify for
enhancement under the ACCA, but the crime pled to may not qualify.96 If
later federal sentencing courts were allowed to use the modified approach on
a much looser basis, defendants could be found to have pled to the qualifying
crime for ACCA enhancement based on “extraneous statements in the

86
Id. (“Congress instead meant [for the] ACCA to function as an on-off switch, directing
that a prior crime would qualify as a predicate offense in all cases or in none.”).
87
Id. at 2289 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s ruling flouts our reasoning—here, by extending
judicial factfinding beyond the recognition of a prior conviction.”).
88
See id. (“But the Ninth Circuit’s reworking authorizes the court to try to discern what a
trial showed, or a plea proceeding revealed, about the defendant’s underlying conduct . . . .
And there’s the constitutional rub.” (internal citation omitted)).
89
Id. (“The Sixth Amendment contemplates that a jury—not a sentencing court—will find
such facts, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. And the only facts the court can be
sure the jury so found are those constituting elements of the offense—as distinct from
amplifying but legally extraneous circumstances.”).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
See id. (“[Descamps] likely was not thinking about the possibility that his silence could
come back to haunt him in an ACCA sentencing 30 years in the future. (Actually, he could not
have been thinking that thought: [the] ACCA was not even on the books at the time of
Descamps’ burglary conviction.”)).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
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record.”97
Descamps was a pushback against lower courts’ expansion of the
modified categorical approach. While Taylor, Shepard, and other cases made
it clear that the modified approach was only appropriate for a narrow category
of cases, lower courts misinterpreted those cases and applied the modified
approach to improperly enhance sentences under the ACCA.98 Those courts
should only have used the formal categorical approach, which would have
cut off all further inquiry. While both lower courts and the executive followed
what they believed to be the proper interpretation of longstanding precedent,
Descamps gave clear direction going forward to protect defendants from
methods the Court viewed as going too far.
The Court, however, did not explicitly lay out a test for determining
when a statute actually is divisible; that is, when it lists alternative elements,
not alternative means. The Court did somewhat address this issue in footnote
2 of the opinion.99 Responding to the dissent’s point that “distinguishing
between ‘alternative elements’ and ‘alternative means’ is difficult,” the Court
stated “[w]hen a state law is drafted in the alternative, the court merely resorts
to the approved [Taylor/Shepard] documents and compares the elements
revealed there to those of the generic offense.”100
This reasoning presented a few problems. First, it seems to be wholly at
odds with the policies articulated in the body of Justice Kagan’s opinion,
which clearly prohibit a court from considering these documents without first
deciding whether the statute is divisible as a threshold issue. If the categorical
approach was designed to foster an elements inquiry and to prevent judicial
fact-finding based upon faulty documents, it does not follow that courts
should be able to engage in fact-finding to determine the threshold issue of
whether the statute is divisible. While some have characterized footnote 2 as
a “clear instruction,”101 it appeared to not be reconciled with the main text of
the opinion. At the very least, this caused more confusion among the lower

97
Id. (“Taylor recognized the problem: If a guilty plea to a lesser, nonburglary offense
was the result of a plea bargain . . . it would seem unfair to impose a sentence enhancement as
if the defendant had pleaded guilty to generic burglary. That way of proceeding, on top of
everything else, would allow a later sentencing court to rewrite the parties’ bargain.” (quoting
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601–602 (1990)) (internal quotation marks, citations,
and alterations omitted)).
98
See United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 944 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(per curiam) (abrogated by Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2286–92).
99
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 n.2.
100
Id.
101
Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 469–71 (9th Cir. 2015) (Graber, J., dissenting from
the denial of en banc review).
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courts.102
The question, thus, was still left largely unanswered: how is a court to
determine when a statute lists divisible elements (two distinct sets of elements
within the whole103) instead of simply different means by which to complete
the same element? In other words, what test should courts use to determine
when a statute is divisible?
B. WHEN A STATUTE LISTS MEANS OR ELEMENTS: MATHIS

The question of divisible statutes wound its way to the Court again three
years after Decamps in Mathis v. United States.104 On January 21, 2014,
Richard Mathis pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of the ACCA.105 Mathis’s previous felonies were for five prior
burglary convictions in Iowa.106 At sentencing, the prosecution requested a
sentence enhancement like in Descamps, arguing his prior convictions were
predicates under the ACCA.107
The Iowa burglary statutes in question prohibited unlawfully entering
any “occupied structure,”108 defined as “any building, structure, . . . vehicle,
or similar place.”109 The district court found the Iowa statute to be divisible
and applied the modified categorical approach to determine which elements
Mathis was convicted of in order to further determine whether they were
predicates for sentence enhancement.110 The district court found these prior
convictions were violent felonies and sentenced him to the mandatory
minimum of fifteen years under the ACCA.111
The Eighth Circuit affirmed.112 Even though the Eighth Circuit noted
102

E.g., compare Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the
means/elements distinction prevented looking at the Taylor/Shepard documents to resolve the
divisibility issue), with United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1069 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d,
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (holding that Descamps expressly rejected a
means/elements distinction and always allowed looking at the approved documents if the
statute criminalized more conduct than the generic offense).
103
See Rendon, 764 F.3d at 1086.
104
136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
105
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
106
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250.
107
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
108
Iowa Code §§ 713.1 (defining burglary as unlawfully entering, remaining in, or
breaking an occupied structure with “intent to commit a felony, assault, or theft therein”),
713.5 (defining second-degree burglary, in part, as burglary in an occupied structure).
109
Iowa Code §§ 702.12 (defining “occupied structure”).
110
Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1070–71, rev’d, Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2243.
111
Id. at 1071.
112
Id. at 1076.
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the Iowa statute “sweeps more broadly than generic burglary” due to the
expanded definition of “occupied structure,” it concluded this was “the exact
type of divisibility contemplated in Taylor and later solved in Shepard.”113
Thus, the modified categorical approach was the “proper tool to determine
whether Mathis’s prior convictions are ‘violent felonies.’”114
The Eighth Circuit rejected Mathis’s argument that these were not
alternative elements, but rather alternative means by which to satisfy the
same element.115 The circuit court reasoned that footnote 2 of Descamps
actually eliminated a means/elements distinction and held that any
disjunctive list within a criminal statute made the statute divisible.116 Thus,
whenever this type of list exists in a statute that sweeps broader than the
generic offense, the court is allowed to look at the documents approved by
the modified categorical approach to determine if the defendant was
convicted of a “violent felony” under the ACCA.117
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in another majority
opinion written by Justice Kagan.118 The Court reaffirmed that “a state crime
cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate if its elements are broader than those
of a listed generic offense” and “[h]ow a given defendant actually perpetrated
the crime . . . makes no difference; . . . the mismatch of elements saves [him]
from an ACCA sentence.”119 The Court also clarified that there indeed was a
means/elements distinction, holding the existence of a disjunctive list “gives
a sentencing court no special warrant to explore the facts of an offense, rather
than to determine the crime’s elements and compare them with the generic
definition.”120
The Court did address what it called “the first task of a sentencing
court”: figuring out whether a statute lists elements or means.121 The Court,
reasoning that a state is the final authority on the interpretation of its own
laws, held that “authoritative sources of state law” on the matter are the first
thing a sentencing court should look for.122 Thus, if the state’s courts have
already interpreted the statute to contain alternative elements or means, “a
113

Id. at 1074.
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1074–75.
117
Id. at 1075. The Eighth Circuit’s decision created a circuit split on this issue. Mathis v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 (2016).
118
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247, 2250.
119
Id. at 2251.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 2256.
122
Id.
114
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sentencing judge need only follow what [such a ruling] says.” 123 Another
authoritative source is the face of the state criminal statute itself.124 If the
listed alternatives require different penalties, then they must be different
elements.125 On the other hand, if the statute merely gives “illustrative
examples,” they are means to commit the crime.126 Finally, the statute itself
may also indicate what is essential to be charged (elements) and what is not
(means).127
In Mathis’s case, the Iowa Supreme Court has previously interpreted the
burglary statute at issue to list “alternative methods of committing the same
offense, so that a jury need not agree whether the burgled location was a
building, other structure, or vehicle.”128 Thus, the statutes that Mathis was
previously convicted under were not divisible and the modified categorical
approach was not applicable to the case.129 Therefore, since the conduct
criminalized by the Iowa burglary statutes was greater than the generic
offense, none of Mathis’s prior convictions could be used as predicates under
the ACCA and his sentence could not be enhanced.130
The Court, albeit in dicta, also clarified the ambiguities Descamps.131 If
the sources of state law fail to clarify whether the listed alternatives are
elements or means, the sentencing court should look to the approved
Taylor/Shepard documents “for the sole and limited purpose of determining
whether the listed items are elements of the offense.”132 The record would
reveal what the prosecutor would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
and what jurors could disagree on yet still find all the elements were
123

Id. (citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991) (plurality) (“If a State’s courts
have determined that certain statutory alternatives are mere means of committing a single
offense, rather than independent elements of the crime, we simply are not at liberty to ignore
that determination and conclude that the alternatives are, in fact, independent elements under
state law.”)).
124
Id.
125
Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000)); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 28.35.060 (requiring motorists in accidents to both provide their personal information and
render reasonable assistance to any person injured (subsection (a)), but making it a
misdemeanor to fail to provide information (subsection (b)) and a felony to fail to render
reasonable assistance (subsection (c))).
126
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.
127
Id.
128
Id. (citing State v. Duncan, 312 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Iowa 1981)).
129
Id. at 2253–54.
130
Id. at 2257.
131
Id. at 2251.
132
Id. at 2256–57 (quoting Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 473–74 (9th Cir. 2015)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of reh’g en banc) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted)).
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proved.133 In the unlikely event the documents do not resolve the inquiry,
“Taylor’s demand for certainty” will never be satisfied and the offense should
not be considered an ACCA predicate.134 However, this last situation is likely
to be extraordinarily rare.135
The sentencing court is still prohibited from using those record
documents if it turns out the statute only lists means and not elements.136 The
Court explained it had no problem with a sentencing judge knowing the
underlying facts of a previous conviction, so long as that judge did not use
those facts to determine the previous conviction was a predicate offense if
the elements did not match up.137
Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion because it faithfully
applied the Court’s precedents, but wrote separately to express his
reservations with the elements based approach.138 To Justice Kennedy, the
elements based approach is compelled by the Court’s interpretation of
Congress’s statutes and, if Congress has a problem with this approach, it can
overturn those precedents.139 That being said, the majority opinion, to him,
“is a stark illustration of the arbitrary and inequitable results produced by
applying an elements based approach to this sentencing scheme.”140 To
Justice Kennedy, Congress could never have intended for career offenders to
be shielded from punishment or face “vast sentencing disparities” compared
to defendants in other jurisdictions for the same exact conduct.141 He
reasoned, however, that it was not for the Court to overturn their own
precedent (absent an appropriate case), but for Congress to fix on their own
by amending the ACCA.142
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the
elements/means distinction is an unnecessary complication to sentencing and
causes more confusion among lower courts than it provides clarity.143 To
133

Id.
Id. (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 21 (2005)).
135
Id.
136
Id. at 2257.
137
Id. at 2251 (“In some cases, a sentencing judge knows (or can easily discover) that the
defendant carried out a ‘real’ burglary, even though the crime of conviction also extends to
other conduct. No matter. Under ACCA . . . it is impermissible for a particular crime [to]
sometimes count towards enhancement and sometimes not, depending on the facts of the
case.”).
138
Id. at 2258.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 2259.
134
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Justice Breyer, the distinction between the two makes sense in the abstract,
but the distinction does not make a difference in practical application at
sentencing.144 While this distinction is relevant to the state’s own application
of its criminal law, to Justice Breyer, it makes no sense to use it in federal
sentencing.145 The approach that uses this distinction is impractical or
unworkable in real situations, and “will produce a time-consuming legal
tangle” for lower courts to slog through.146
Justice Breyer argued what should really matter are the facts designated
in the statute, not whether those facts are used by the state as elements or
means.147 He would do away with the elements/means distinction and instead
allow prior convictions to serve as predicates if “(1) the statute at issue lists
the alternative means by which a defendant can commit the crime . . . and (2)
the charging documents make clear that the . . . jury or trial judge necessarily
found . . . an alternative that matches the federal version of the crime.”148
Justice Alito also dissented and heavily criticized the Court’s
precedent.149 To Justice Alito, the Court’s categorical/modified categorical
approaches, indivisible/divisible inquiries, and now elements/means
distinctions had created an unworkable and impractical way of determining
whether previous convictions were indeed “violent felonies.”150 Justice Alito
instead advocated for “[a] real-world approach [to] avoid the mess” produced
by previous decisions which would allow the sentencing court to look at the
record regardless of elements.151 If it is clear the underlying facts support the
previous conviction as a predicate for ACCA purposes, then it counts.152 It
would not count, however, “[i]f the record is lost or inconclusive.”153 To
Justice Alito, the majority’s approach rendered real-world facts irrelevant and
instead advanced “pointless formalism.”154

144

Id. at 2261.
Id.
146
Id. at 2264.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 2265 (emphasis in original). The majority responded to Justice Breyer by
restating that the Court’s precedents (such as Taylor, Shepard and even Descamps) dictated
the use of the elements/means distinction. Id. at 2254–56.
149
Id. at 2265–70.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 2269–70.
152
Id. at 2270.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 2271. The majority responded to Justice Alito in much the same way it did to
Justice Breyer. See id. at 2254 n.4.
145
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III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court noted in Taylor and its progeny that, by specifically
identifying certain crimes as predicates in statutes such as the ACCA,
Congress created categories of offenses that excluded other offenses which
did not fit the generic definition.155 Congress intended both to prevent
arbitrary limitations by state definition and to provide fundamental fairness
to offenders.156 According to the Court, sentence enhancement cannot turn
“on whether the State of [an offender’s] prior conviction happened to call
[the] conduct” a particular offense.157
Thus, it is a matter of statutory interpretation when a court is faced with
the question of whether a prior conviction is a predicate for sentence
enhancement (or removal) or not. In other words, Congress has created these
categories of generic crimes in a way that draws a line between predicate,
generic offenses and non-predicate offenses.158 The courts are not to exercise
their own judgment as to whether the specific facts of the underlying
conviction fit into these categories, but only to whether the elements of the
state criminal statute at issue fit into a generic category.159 Moreover, the
Court, in adopting the categorical approach, highlights a preference to
prevent judicial fact-finding into underlying convictions and to preserve jury
fact-finding from being subverted.160
There are still giant ambiguities, however, when it comes to putting the
approaches into practice. Justice Alito was correct that this area of
interpretation is fraught with peril and misunderstanding among the lower
courts. Historically, determining when the modified approach was
155

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 591 (1990). While the amendments at issue in
Taylor eliminated a specific definition of burglary, the Court noted that “[w]ithout a clear
indication that . . . [it] intended to abandon its general approach of using uniform categorical
definitions to identify predicate offenses, we do not interpret Congress’ omission of a
definition of ‘burglary’ in a way that leads to odd results of [different application from state
to state].” Id.
156
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 582; see also S. Rep. No. 98–190, p. 20 (1983) (“Because of the
wide variation among states and localities in the ways that offenses are labeled, the absence of
definitions raised the possibility that culpable offenders might escape punishment [at the
federal level] on a technicality. . . . [F]or purposes of this Act, such limitations are not
appropriate. Furthermore, in terms of fundamental fairness [to the defendant], the Act should
ensure, to the extent that it is consistent with the prerogatives of the States in defining their
own offenses, that the same type of conduct is punishable on the Federal level in all cases.”).
157
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 591.
158
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013).
159
Id.
160
See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2282 (2013); Johnson v. United States,
559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 49 (2009); Shepard v. United
States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990).
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appropriate was immensely confusing for lower courts and led to inconsistent
results, especially pre-Descamps. For instance, in United States v. AguilaMontes De Oca, the Ninth Circuit held that the modified approach applied to
an indivisible statute simply because it was broader than the generic crime. 161
In United States v. Venzor-Granillo, the Tenth Circuit held that the modified
approach applied merely because the language in the statute was ambiguous
through criminalizing broader conduct.162 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Fife held that the statutory phrase “any felony” required a
sentencing court to look beyond the fact of conviction to see what felony met
the element.163 And in United States v. Martinez-Hernandez, another Tenth
Circuit case, the court stated “when the underlying statute reaches a broad
range of conduct, some of which merits an enhancement and some of which
does not, courts resolve the resulting ambiguity by consulting reliable judicial
records, such as the charging document, plea agreement, or plea colloquy.”164
These holdings clearly confused the statutory interpretation function of the
categorical and modified categorical approaches.
Even post-Descamps, this approach has still created confusion, often in
the same jurisdiction.165 In addition to being not particularly easy to
determine, deciding the means or elements has been a source of frustration
for the lower courts as well.166
Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito were also all correct in concluding
that the approaches have caused arbitrary results for defendants and lawful
permanent residents, as they could have their sentences enhanced or be sent
to a different country depending on what judicial circuit they inhabit, rather
than creating a consistent application of federal statutes across all federal
jurisdictions. According to the Taylor Court, this is exactly what Congress
did not want to happen (albeit with an eye to differing state criminal
statutes).167 As Kennedy noted, while this approach is dictated by the statute
and is intended to create uniform application of federal sentencing law, in
practice it becomes what it was intended to avoid: a patchwork of different
161

655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam), abrogated by Descamps v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2286–92 (2013).
162
668 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012).
163
624 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2010).
164
422 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 2005).
165
See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2268. For an illustration, compare Rendon v. Holder, 764
F.3d 1077, 1084–90 (9th Cir. 2014), where the panel opinion held that looking at the
Taylor/Shepard documents was inappropriate without first finding the statute is divisible, with
its denial of en banc review, 782 F.3d 466, 466–474, where nine judges disagreed.
166
See Rendon, 782 F.3d at 471 (describing the inquiry after Descamps as “notoriously
uncertain” and leading to “uncertain results”).
167
See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590–91.
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results dependent upon where the conduct took place, regardless if it was
targeted by the statute.168
Another complication in the means/elements determination is the
tension between the rationale for the modified approach stated in Descamps
and the method for determining whether a statute it divisible in Mathis. The
Descamps Court clarified that the modified approach is only a tool that allows
a court to determine what crime someone was convicted of when faced with
several alternatives so that crime can be compared to the generic offense.169
The Court has never held that it is an exception that allows those courts to
look at the underlying facts from that previous conviction to decide for itself
what facts supported the defendant’s conviction.170 The modified approach is
only allowed when the defendant is convicted under a divisible statute that
contains more than one offense within the same set of elements.171 Even when
the modified approach is used, a court is still only allowed to discover what
elements the defendant was convicted of and not the underlying facts of the
conviction.172 The tight restrictions on its use illustrate the Court’s preference
for using it sparingly and only when necessary.
Mathis was a further tightening of the controls for when this approach
can and cannot be used, but, curiously, the Court approved of a lower court
crossing the threshold to make the determination of whether it can cross the
threshold.173 The Court appeared confident that a sentencing court—and, by
extension, an immigration judge—would not use its knowledge of the true
underlying facts when making the threshold determination of divisible or

168

Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258.
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013).
170
Id.; see also Michael R. Devitt, Improper Deportation of Legal Permanent Residents:
The U.S. Government’s Mischaracterization of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Nijhawan v.
Holder, 15 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 12 (2013); Cam Barker et al., United States Supreme Court
Update, 26 APP. ADVOC. 72, 77 (2013).
171
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285; see also Mario K. Castillo, Immigration Consequences:
A Primer for Texas Criminal Defense Attorneys in Light of Padilla v. Kentucky, 63 BAYLOR
L. REV. 587, 607 (2011); Nelson A. Vargas-Padilla, The Immigration Consequences of
Criminal Conduct, 3 CRIM. L. BRIEF 24, 25 (2007).
172
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285; Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[W]hen it is not clear from the statutory definition of the prior offense whether that offense
constitutes a removable offense . . . we apply a ‘modified’ categorical approach under which
we may look beyond the language of the statute to a narrow, specified set of documents that
are part of the record of conviction, including ‘the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury
instructions, a signed guilty plea, or the transcript from the plea proceedings.’” (quoting United
States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc))).
173
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256–57.
169
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indivisible.174 As Justice Breyer alluded to,175 this may make sense in an
abstract sense, but—like much of the previous lower court decisions in this
area—in practice it may lead to more confusion and misapplication at federal
sentencing or removal proceedings. In this sense, Justice Alito’s dissent
could, in the end, serve as a template for overruling these cases and instead
impose a “real-world [and practical] approach [to] avoid the mess” created
by these lines of cases.176
CONCLUSION
In this area of statutory interpretation, the Court’s decisions have all
started with good intentions. They have all attempted to balance the
requirements of the ACCA and other federal statutes with the protections
afforded by the statutory text, other court precedent and the Constitution
itself.177 However, each Court opinion has left the lower courts scratching
their heads in attempts to figure out which approach — categorical or
modified categorical—is appropriate. Mathis has already been cited by a few
different circuits, with somewhat inconsistent results.178 Time will tell if the
Court will have to address this issue again and whether it will attempt to
resolve further ambiguities, or, as Justice Alito suggested, scrap it, turn the
car around, and start all over again at the beginning.

174

Id. at 2251.
Id. at 2261–62.
176
Id. at 2269–70.
177
See id. at 2259–60 (Thomas, J. concurring) (arguing that “depending on judge-found
facts in Armed Career Criminal Act [] cases violates the Sixth Amendment and is
irreconcilable with Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000)]”).
178
Compare United States v. Edwards, 836 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2016) (“recourse to
state-court charging documents was improper” when answer to the question was on the
statute’s face) with United States v. Henderson, No. 15-1562, 2016 WL 6595945, at *6–7 (3d
Cir. Nov. 8, 2016) (proper for sentencing court to look at charging documents even if state’s
own interpretation and the face of the statute confirm the statute lists elements and not means).
175

